Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works
2019

War is More Than a Political Question: Reestablishing Original
Constitutional Norms
John C. Dehn
Loyola University Chicago, Law School, jdehn@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Dehn, John C., War is More Than a Political Question: Reestablishing Original Constitutional Norms, 51
Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 485 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information,
please contact law-library@luc.edu.

War is More Than a Political Question:
Reestablishing Original Constitutional Norms
John C. Dehn*
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 485
I. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM .............................. 486
II. CONGRESSIONAL PRIMACY OVER MILITARY FORCE AND THE
ARMED FORCES ..................................................................... 490
A. Congressional Powers ................................................. 491
B. Presidential Military and War Powers ........................ 497
C. Judicial Precedent ....................................................... 503
III. HOW CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE LOST CONTROL................. 504
IV. WHY ABERRANT PRACTICE CANNOT ESTABLISH NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.......................................................... 510
V. REESTABLISHING ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS OVER
NON-DEFENSIVE MILITARY FORCE ....................................... 518
CONCLUSION................................................................................. 521
INTRODUCTION
This Essay disputes the view that a president’s independent authority
to use non-defensive armed military force short of a “major conflict” is
merely a political question rather than an issue affirmatively regulated by
the Constitution, congressional enactments, and established legal
principles of necessity.1 The Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz

* Associate Professor and Faculty Director, National Security & Civil Rights Program, Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. The author thanks the symposium participants, Barry Sullivan,
Alan Raphael, and Alex Tsesis for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. This essay expands upon my public remarks at the symposium on April 5, 2019. The term
“military force” refers to armed attacks or hostile territorial invasions by elements of the U.S. armed
forces acting as such. It thereby excludes other uses of force, whether armed or unarmed, such as
those engaged in pursuant to congressionally-authorized covert action. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)(2)
(2019) (expressly excluding “traditional . . . military activities”) and cyber intrusion operations
that do not result in more than negligible physical damage to persons or property. 10 U.S.C. §
394(b) (2018) (authorizing military cyber activities or operations “short of hostilities” as the term
is used in the War Powers Resolution). “Military force” also excludes consensual military presence
in a foreign territory for purposes other than using combative force, such as to provide disaster
recovery aid or assistance. For excellent commentary on the constitutionality of covert action
statutes, see Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986).
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wrote that war is the continuation of politics by other means.2 This is
certainly a fair observation of international relations, in which armed
force remains a permissible means for achieving various geopolitical
ends.3 Under the Constitution, however, a decision to use non-defensive
military force should result from the Constitution’s law-making process,4
rather than—as is now often the case—begin, truncate, or ignore that
process.
This Essay briefly reviews the current situation and comprehensively
surveys the Constitution’s allocation of war- and military-related powers
to demonstrate Congress's extensive authority over war and the nation's
armed forces. This review strongly confirms the view that the
Constitution requires Congress to affirmatively authorize all nondefensive military force and provides Congress with several powers to
check a president's use and command of the military. It then briefly posits
some of the reasons these constitutional norms have eroded, clarifies why
aberrant past practice cannot amend the Constitution's separation of war
powers, and explains why Congress must reestablish its authority, briefly
suggesting two ways that it may do so.
I. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
Since World War II, it has become increasingly common practice for
presidents to use non-defensive military force abroad without obtaining
congressional preapproval, thereby leaving Congress with no meaningful
role in the decision. Recent examples include: the Trump
Administration’s missile strikes against targets in Syria in response to the
alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians;5 the Obama
Administration’s aerial attacks and other actions supporting United
2. See 1 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 23 (The Floating Press trans., The Floating Press
2010) (1832) (defining war as a “political instrument, a continuation of the same by other means”).
3. Although the use of armed force as a means of settling disputes in international affairs is now
tempered by the United Nations Charter, military force is the Security Council’s last resort for
addressing and resolving threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. See
U.N. Charter arts. 1–2 (stating the purposes of the United Nations are to maintain peace and to
harmonize the actions of nations); id. at arts. 39–42 (describing the Security Council’s authority to
determine the existence of threats to peace and which measures may be undertaken to restore peace,
including measures involving the use of armed force).
4. A congressional declaration of war may not properly be termed a “law” but results from the
same process by which laws are typically adopted. Other congressional enactments authorizing
armed hostilities also result from this process. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing use of “necessary and appropriate” military
force in response to the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001).
5. See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1–
3 (Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel 2018) [hereinafter Syrian
Airstrikes Memorandum] (describing strikes and alleged authority to order them).
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Nations authorized measures to protect civilians in Libya;6 and the
Clinton Administration’s uses of force against Serbia as part of North
Atlantic Treaty Organization operations to protect Kosovars, among
many others.7 Of these three examples, only one was authorized by the
Security Council of the United Nations (Libya).8 The Security Council is
the only body empowered by international law to use or authorize nondefensive force against other nations.9 Additionally, none of these uses
of military force received prior congressional authorization or formal,
post hoc congressional condemnation.10
This modern practice is clearly at odds with the Constitution’s text and
original meaning. A wealth of scholarly commentary concludes that the
Constitution grants Congress alone the power to authorize non-defensive
military force.11 Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution,
ample commentary also concludes that a president has inherent
constitutional power to defend the nation from an actual or impending
attack.12
6. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1–6 (Caroline D. Krass,
Principle Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel 2011) [hereinafter Military Force
in Libya Memorandum] (explaining that the Libyan government’s attacks on civilians led to United
States military involvement in the conflict based upon United Nations authorization President
Obama’s constitutional authority and discretion).
7. For a thorough catalog and concise summary of the U.S. uses of military force abroad through
late 2017, see BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF
USE OF ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2017 (2017).
8. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing all measures necessary to protect certain
civilians, but prohibiting an occupation force).
9. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (preserving nations’ inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense).
10. See TORREON, supra note 7 at 17, 25-27 (describing the Serbian and Libyan attacks).
11. See, e.g., DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 21–33 (2016) (describing Constitutional Convention debates: “they
leaned hard in Congress’s favor when making the decision between war and peace” while
recognizing president “would need power to repel sudden attacks”); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993)
(asserting that the power to declare war is constitutionally vested in Congress); MICHAEL D.
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 218–38 (2007) (arguing that the
drafters of the Constitution specifically designed the federal government such that executive power
was not centralized in one branch, giving some power to the Executive Branch but reserving power
that had traditionally gone to a king within a monarchy system instead to Congress, including the
power to wage non-defensive war); Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the
Constitution Means by “Declare War”, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 47 (2007) (asserting Congress’s
unique power to declare war was developed by the Framers of the Constitution). See also William
Michael Treanor, Fame, The Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695,
696 (1997) (listing numerous other proponents of this view).
12. See, e.g., BARRON, supra note 11, at 22 (explaining the constitutional convention
acknowledged the necessity of vesting the power to repel a sudden attack in the executive); ELY,
supra note 11, at 6 (arguing that because some military emergencies can arise faster than Congress
can act, the founders intended for the president to be able to act quickly where a clear danger to
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Nevertheless, some commentators and courts have asserted that a
modern president’s inherent, independent constitutional power to use
non-defensive military force is a political rather than a legal question.13
Put differently, they argue that a president’s constitutional authority to
invade the rights of other nations and their citizens through non-defensive
military force—and thereby to risk lives, liberty, and property interests
of United States citizens—is subject to the whims of the president and
any political responses by Congress. One commentator recently argued
that this situation results from the fact that labeling various types of
military actions, for example, as “offensive” or “defensive,” is difficult
and the Constitution’s allocation of war powers to the executive and
legislative branches is ambiguous and uncertain in any given context.14
Even more troubling, contemporary executive branch legal advisers
claim that presidents possess inherent and independent constitutional
authority to use non-defensive military force whenever they can make a
colorable claim that doing so advances a “national interest” and when the
“anticipated hostilities” do not constitute a “war in the constitutional
sense.”15 What is meant by “war in the constitutional sense” is not clear16
and has changed over time.17 The term is more recently asserted to mean
national security develops unexpectedly and requires immediate military response); RAMSEY,
supra note 11, at 239–48 (arguing that the founders believed that the president retained some
powers to use military force as needed); Prakash, supra note 11, at 116–18 (stating that historically,
the president has had the power to repel “sudden attacks,” such as in the case of thwarting Indian
raids).
13. For some such commentary, see, e.g., MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 21–22 (2013) (explaining how the view of presidential power
regarding military action has changed over time to one of political rather than juridical dimensions);
see also Treanor, supra note 11, at 696 (listing scholars who believe executive branch possesses
independent constitutional power to initiate military force or that entire matter is political question).
For references to judicial decisions, see, e.g., infra Section II.C (stating that Congress holds the
power for non-defensive war acts).
14. ZEISBERG, supra note 13, at 20–21.
15. See, e.g., Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 9–10 (describing “quasi-war,” or
a situation where limited military engagements are necessary but the concern did not rise to the
level of a true declaration of war).
16. See, e.g., id. at 9 n.3 and related text (discussing longstanding executive branch view that
some military engagements require congressional approval but others, based upon their “scale,” do
not—but without any attempt to articulate the “scale” of military conflict that is constitutionally
significant).
17. For example, the Truman Administration publicly (but never “formally”) claimed that the
Korean conflict was not a “war” requiring congressional approval because it was a “police action”
under the authority of the United Nations. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis
Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 33–34 (1995) [hereinafter Fisher, Korean War]
(explaining that the Truman administration crafted a narrative that his actions in declaring military
action in Korea fell within the presidential military powers but that in reality, Truman preempted
Congress in his decision making). It would seem that the scale of American involvement in Korea
constituted a “war” in any logical understanding of the term. According to the Congressional
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that the anticipated intensity and scale of non-defensive military
operations will not result in a major military conflict that should require
Congress to declare war.18 It is, of course, dubious to claim that a
president’s prediction about whether a major conflict will result from a
given military attack determines his or her inherent power to order one.
This approach fallaciously presumes that the executive branch can
accurately predict the responses of other nations.
Executive branch assertions regarding what constitutes a sufficient
national interest have also been irreconcilably inconsistent. Some include
claims that a use of non-defensive military force will bolster the
credibility or authority of the United Nations.19 Other non-defensive uses
of force have clearly violated the United Nations Charter and the will of
its Security Council.20 According to the legal memorandum that
rationalized the Trump Administration missile strikes against Syria after
the fact, an adequate national interest includes virtually anything a
president deems to be so.21
The current reality is that presidents may, in practice, get away with
using non-defensive military force if Congress ultimately acquiesces in
their decision to do so—either by expressing no formal opposition at all
or by providing a president with funding and other support.22 This
Research Service, as of August 29, 2018, an estimated 1,789,000 Americans served in Korea during
the three-year conflict; 36,574 were killed or died as the result of their service, and 103,284 were
wounded. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL32492, AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 2, 8 (2018); id. at 8.
18. See, e.g., Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 18–22 (conducting “fact-specific
assessment of the anticipated nature, scope and duration of the planned military operations,”
including “whether U.S. forces were likely to encounter signification armed resistance . . . [or]
suffer or inflict substantial casualties”).
19. See, e.g., Fisher, Korean War, supra note 17, at 33 (discussing Truman administration
arguments that intervention in Korea was essential to upholding the United Nations Charter and the
“rule of law,” but noting that Truman admitted he would have acted without U.N. approval if
needed).
20. The Trump Administration strikes against Syria were not approved by the Security Council
of the United Nations. See, e.g., Caitlin A. Buckley, Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria, 5 J.
STRATEGIC SEC. 81, 88–89 (2012) (discussing international opposition to intervention in Syria,
including Russian refusal to allow Security Council action similar to that pertaining to Libya). The
legal memorandum rationalizing the strikes in Syria did not even attempt to reconcile them with
the United Nations Charter or other international law. See generally Syrian Airstrikes
Memorandum, supra note 5.
21. See Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 10 (“The scope of U.S. involvement
in the world, the presence of U.S. citizens across the globe, and U.S. leadership in times of conflict,
crisis, and strife require that the President have wide latitude to protect American interests by
responding to regional conflagrations and humanitarian catastrophes as he believes appropriate. . . .
We would not expect that any President would use this power without a substantial basis for
believing that a proposed operation is necessary to advance important interests of the Nation.”).
22. Although Congress never clearly authorized hostilities in Korea, it took several actions to

490

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

politically-motivated convention,23 or practice, among our co-equal
branches of government is not the original constitutional design.24 As the
Supreme Court has said in another context, “the presence of
constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not
automatically [create a nonjusticiable] political question. . . .”25
This Essay rejects the notion that a president’s independent
constitutional authority to use non-defensive military force is, as a matter
of constitutional law, left solely to the routine political give and take of
the elected branches. In a republic based upon fundamental individual
rights to life, liberty, and property—and of a limited central government
constrained by fundamental law—legislative acts and well-accepted
principles of necessity must govern a president’s legal authority to invade
individual rights by a use of military force. A more complete contextual
and structural reading of the Constitution’s text, as well as early
government practice and relevant Supreme Court precedent, demonstrate
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution believed these basic,
rule-of-law and separation-of-powers principles to be thoroughly etched
into the Constitution’s original design.
II. CONGRESSIONAL PRIMACY OVER MILITARY FORCE AND THE ARMED
FORCES
A careful review of the Constitution’s text reveals that it vests
Congress, not the president, with sole control over decisions to use nondefensive military force and with a large measure of superior authority
over the nation’s armed forces. Furthermore, early presidents believed,
and pre-World War II Supreme Court precedent established, that only
express or implied congressional authorization or an imperative necessity
to defend the nation, including its territories instrumentalities, and

support them, including extending the draft, see Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, Pub. L.
No. 81-599, 64 Stat. 318 (codified June 30, 1950) (stating that the draft extends to every male
citizen “now or hereafter in the United States”); 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 82-51, 65 Stat. 75 (codified June 19, 1951) (broadly stating
that the draft applies to all male citizens from ages eighteen to twenty-six, and that male citizens
must register and appear for the draft when military action is declared).
23. For a definition and an analysis of “constitutional conventions”, see generally Keith E.
Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1847 (2013).
24. But see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 48 (2013) (asserting
that “beginning with [the] Korea[n conflict] an amendment-level constitutional change” established
by the practice of the elected branches now grants the president broad, independent authority to
take the nation to war). I address this claim in Part IV, infra.
25. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942–43 (1983) (explaining the political question doctrine in
the context of Congressional action on deportation versus Executive authority on the matter).
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perhaps its citizens, permits the unilateral use of military force by the
executive branch.26
A. Congressional Powers
Article I, Section 8 contains most of the affirmative grants of
congressional power. There are eighteen clauses, some containing
multiple powers.27 Commentary discussing a president’s independent
power to use military force typically focuses on the scope and substance
of Congress’s power to “declare war.”28 While that analysis is necessary
and appropriate, it can be misleading if it ignores the larger context in
which the power to declare war is constitutionally situated. To understand
Congress’s constitutional primacy over the nation’s military and its use,
a more comprehensive analysis of congressional powers is essential.
Congressional powers over the military, its use, and related matters are
numerous and substantial. Seven of the eighteen clauses in Article I,
Section 8 explicitly give Congress control over the existence,
composition, organization, training, and discipline of the armed forces,
including state militias, as well as the funding of military operations, the
control of military installations, and the use of military force.29 Other
clauses give Congress integral or closely-related powers. Section 10 of
Article I strengthens congressional control by denying similar powers to
the states without congressional approval.30 An analysis of these powers
places the power to declare war in a broader context.
In addition to the power “to declare war,” Article I, Section 8 grants
Congress the following powers, some of which are paraphrased for clarity
and brevity.
26. The precise nature of this defensive power is currently unclear. Executive branch practice
has evolved over time. I intend to more thoroughly examine the scope of the presidency’s defensive
power in future work.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to “declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” among other
powers).
28. See generally RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 218–48; Prakash, supra note 11;. See also John C.
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers,
84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 242–250 (1996) (arguing that in splitting the power to declare war and fund
war between the executive and legislative branches, the framers of the Constitution actually
intended to adopt the traditional monarchical system whereby the executive declares war, except
for “formal” declarations, and the legislature dictates spending; the framers intended the executive
branch to have the power to initiate war and provide an opportunity for the legislature to review
such decisions during the appropriations process).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–17.
30. Id. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage,
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay.”).
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Clause 11 empowers Congress to “grant letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”31 The
power to declare war, coupled with these powers, gives Congress sole
authority to authorize all non-defensive uses of military force as
understood in the founding era.32 That Congress possesses power to grant
letters of marque and reprisal—by which it may commission private
individuals to engage in limited punitive, retaliatory, or other military
measures—strongly implies that the president does not possess
independent constitutional power to engage in even minor uses of force.33
While the nature and scope of these powers is debated, early justices of
the Supreme Court found that limited uses of military force were “public
war” that only Congress could authorize and may also, therefore,
constrain.34 Early presidential and congressional practice also provides
persuasive evidence that the Framers believed only Congress possesses
the constitutional power to authorize the use of non-defensive military
force.35

31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
32. Prakash, supra note 11, at 49–50 (“In the context of the Constitution, the grant of ‘declare
war’ power means that only Congress can decide whether the United States will wage war.”); see
also BARRON, supra note 11, at 22 (noting the draft Constitution “expressly provided that Congress
could declare war” and “even granted Congress the power issue letters of marque and reprisal,
[which] allowed only a very limited use of military power”); RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 218–38
(describing these clauses as “efforts to shift decisionmaking about offensive war from the executive
magistrate . . . to Congress” and stating “the narrow meaning of the declare war clause also fits
poorly with the marque-and-reprisal clause”).
33. Prakash, supra note 11, at 55; Jules Lobel, “Little Wars” and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 61, 70 (1995) (“The Marque and Reprisal Clause was inserted in Article I to ensure that
lesser forms of hostilities came within congressional power. . . . At minimum, the clause supports
a broad interpretation of the Declare War Clause to include all acts of warfare initiated against other
nations.”).
34. See, e.g., Bas. v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.) (“[E]very
contention by force between two nations in external matters, under the authority of their respective
governments, is not only war, but public war.”).
[H]ostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in its nature and extent,
being limited as to places, persons, and things, and this is more properly termed imperfect
war; because not solemn, and because those who are authorized to commit hostilities,
act under special authority, and can go no further than to the extent of their commission.
Still, however, it is public war, because it is an external contention by force between
some of the members of the two nations . . . .
Id. at 40; see also id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“Congress has not declared war in general terms;
but Congress has authorized hostilities on the high seas by certain persons in certain cases. . . . So
far it is, unquestionably, a partial war; but, nevertheless, it is a public war . . . .”); id. at. 46 (opinion
of Patterson, J.) (finding limited naval conflict to be “a public war between the two nations,
qualified, on our part, in the manner prescribed by the constitutional organ of our country”).
35. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 11, at 96–107 (recounting significant early presidential and
congressional practice).
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Clause 12 grants Congress the power “[t]o raise and support Armies,
but no Appropriation” may exceed two years.36 Related to this power and
its two-year limitation, it is no accident: (1) that the House of
Representatives—originally the only representatives directly elected by
the people37—is elected every two years;38 (2) that no money may be
drawn from the treasury except pursuant to appropriations made by law;39
and (3) that all bills raising revenue must originate in the House of
Representatives.40 Raising and maintaining an army requires funding. If
a standing army—an institution thought abhorrent to many in the
Founding Era, especially if maintained in times of peace41—were to be
improperly used for domestic matters, or to fight unnecessary foreign
wars, the Constitution ensures that the people can elect new
representatives with a mandate to stop funding it.42
Clause 13 confers upon Congress the power “[t]o provide and maintain
a Navy.”43 With such a large coast and many navigable waterways, a
navy was a necessary and uncontroversial first line of defense for the
fledgling nation.44 Although Congress had the raw ability not to exercise
this power, America needed a navy to protect both its territory and its
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to raise armies).
37. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Originally, Senators were to be chosen by the state legislatures, id. art.
I, § 3, cl. 1. This was changed by the Seventeenth Amendment, proposed May 13, 1912 and declared
by the Secretary of State to have been ratified by thirty-six states on May 31, 1913 pursuant to id.
art I, § 3, cl. 1.
38. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
39. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
40. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (recounting the dangers of standing
armies).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 42 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean, 1788)
(“Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from
standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their
support.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 1, J. and A.
McLean 1788) (“Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those
who require a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say
that the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of
the people, which is attainable in civil society.”). For a more robust analysis on the constitutional
implications of the budget power in this context, see Lucas Issacharroff & Samuel Issacharroff,
Constitutional Implications of the Cost of War, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2016). Of course, the
current geopolitical environment makes it highly unlikely that the body politic will elect a Congress
with a mandate to defund the U.S. military establishment.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
44. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 42, at 44 (“The palpable necessity of the power to
provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure,
which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of
America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a
principal source of her security against danger from abroad.”).
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foreign commerce.45 In 1794, Congress obliged by authorizing the
president to acquire, equip, and employ six ships with specific
armaments.46 Congress also prescribed not only the exact crew
membership but also their pay and rations,47 demonstrating the
comprehensive control that Congress may exercise over the existence,
composition, and administrative operation of the armed forces should it
choose to do so.
Under clause 14, Congress is given the power to “make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”48 Not only may
Congress decide whether to have armed forces, exactly how many, and
exactly how they will be paid, equipped and supplied, it also has
express—according to the Supreme Court “plenary”—authority to
regulate the conduct of the armed forces once created.49 Executive branch
legal advisors have sometimes claimed that presidents possess the
constitutional power to violate international and some domestic laws
regulating war.50 However, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) enacted by Congress requires members of the armed forces to
comply with these laws and subjects them to criminal prosecution for
unauthorized acts of violence in war.51 The Supreme Court has
consistently required the president and executive branch to comply with
applicable provisions of the UCMJ, including those that incorporate

45. Id.
46. Act to Provide a Naval Armament, sess. 1, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 350 (Mar. 27, 1794).
47. Id. at 350–51. Interestingly, in the alternative, the Act authorized and empowered the
president to acquire, “by purchase or otherwise,” a similar naval force not exceeding that provided
for in the Act. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
49. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 301 (1983)) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that Congress has ‘plenary control over rights,
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations,
procedures, and remedies related to military discipline.’”); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509,
514 (1879) (noting that Congress’s “control over the whole subject of the formation, organization,
and government of the national armies, including therein the punishment of offenses committed by
persons in the military service, would seem to be plenary”); see also Solorio v. United States, 483
U.S. 435, 446 (1987) (“The unqualified language of Clause 14 suggests that whatever these
concerns, they were met by vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive, authority to make rules
for the government of the military.”).
50. U.S. DEP’T DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONCERNS 24 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Def. Working Group Report],
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/OathBetrayed/Rumsfeld%204-4-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQY7-GGLM]
(claiming the president has complete discretion in conduct of hostilities not subject to international
law or even congressional regulation).
51. See generally John C. Dehn, Why a President Cannot Authorize the Military to Violate
(Most of) the Law of War, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813 (2018).
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international laws regulating war by reference.52 Indeed, a
comprehensive study concluded that the Court “has never held that any
statutory limitations on substantive executive war powers have
unconstitutionally infringed upon the core prerogatives of the
commander-in-chief.”53
Clause 15 empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel
invasions.”54 Although not often cited as such, this congressional
power—coupled with the power to provide and maintain a navy, the
president’s constitutional designation as commander in chief, and the
president’s oath55—are the strongest textual evidence of the president’s
independent constitutional power and obligation to defend the nation.56
With no plans for a standing army, a president would first need a navy
and then, potentially, access to land forces to resist any foreign invasion
until Congress could convene to more comprehensively address the
situation.57 Congress’s power to provide for calling forth the militia
implicitly recognizes that the executive branch inherently possesses this
defensive responsibility, but empowers Congress to place controls upon
a president’s access to and use of the personnel necessary to exercise it.58
Current statutes grant the executive branch broad discretion to use the
state militias (the organized elements of which are now called the national

52. See, e.g. Hamdan v. Rumsfled, 554 U.S. 557, 628 (2006) (concluding “compliance with the
law of war is the condition upon which the authority of Article 21 [of the UCMJ, which preserves
authority to use military commissions,] is granted”).
53. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—a
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1106 (2008).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
55. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added) (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”).
56. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a foreign
nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate
the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”).
57. Note that the Constitution requires Congress to convene only once per year. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 1, J. and A. McLean 1788)
(“The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and
invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching
over the internal peace of the Confederacy.”). An excellent student Note traces how and why
Congress initially placed more stringent conditions on calling forth the militia, particularly for
domestic emergencies, but relaxed them over time. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Note,
Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149 (2004).
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guard)59 and federal armed forces for various international and domestic
emergencies and other matters.60
Clause 16 gives Congress the power to, “[p]rovide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them
as may be employed in the service of the United States . . . .”61 Similar to
the armed forces of the United States, Congress controls not only the
ability to levy and federalize the state militias, but also to regulate them
once federalized and to dictate their organization and training by the
states.62
Article I, Section 8 adds several related powers, including the powers
to tax and to “provide for the common defense,”63 “to define and punish
piracies . . . and [other] offences against the law of nations,”64 “to
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over . . . all places
purchased . . . for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings,”65 and to enact any legislation needed to
fully exercise these powers, in the form of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.66
In total, then, more than half of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers
directly relate to its authority to create the armed forces and to regulate
their use. Every use of military force, even defensive force, requires
59. 10 U.S.C. § 246(b) (2019).
60. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301–12304(b) (2019) (providing for calling up reserve components,
including national guard units, for various international and domestic purposes); see also 10 U.S.C.
§§ 252–253 (2019) (providing president with discretion to determine when the active or reserve
military is needed to execute domestic laws, to determine how many troops are required, and to
“take such measures he considers necessary”).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
62. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (emphasis added) (“[R]eserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress . . . .”).
63. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
64. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
65. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
66. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. If there is any question how much work the Necessary and Proper
Clause does in this context, note that it has resulted in the creation of a Coast Guard, an Air Force
and, perhaps soon, a Space Force.
[The Department of Defense] recently developed a series of additional proposals that
would authorize the creation of an 11th unified combatant command responsible for
space. Separately, the Trump Administration called for Congress to establish by 2020 a
new military service branch—Space Force—with the goal of asserting “American
dominance in space.” The new service branch would be the first since the creation of the
U.S. Air Force (previously part of the Army) in 1947.
STEVEN A. HILDRETH ET AL., Cong. RESEARCH SERV., IF10950, TOWARD THE CREATION OF A
U.S. “SPACE FORCE” (2018). President Trump directed the creation of a space-focused combatant
command on December 18, 2018. See Establishment of United States Space Command as a Unified
Combatant Command, 83 Fed. Reg. 65483 (Dec. 18, 2018).
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several acts of legislation. These include acts not only creating and
equipping the armed forces, but also authorizing, funding and regulating
their training and actual operation, whether in domestic or foreign
affairs.67 All of this undermines the common executive branch claim that
a president has substantial autonomous discretion to “direct the military”
or to use military force short of major war in any way he or she sees fit.68
Other elements of the United States Constitution strengthen
congressional control over the nation’s armed forces and their use by
denying similar powers to the several states. Article I, Section 10 forbids
states from maintaining troops or ships of war in times of peace without
the consent of Congress,69 and prohibits states from granting letters of
marque and reprisal.70 It also prohibits states from engaging in war
“unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of
delay.”71 These clauses further clarify that absent a need to defend the
nation from an actual or imminent attack, Congress alone controls the
existence and use of the nation’s armed forces.72
These complementary congressional powers are likely why the
Supreme Court declared in 1801 that “the whole powers of war” are
constitutionally vested in Congress rather than the president.73 This
phrasing potentially encompasses not only Congress’s sole power to
authorize non-defensive uses of military force, including their scope and
related matters (such as compensation for prize captures), but also the
power to create, regulate, and put conditions upon the access to and use
of the national armed forces for any legitimate purpose.
B. Presidential Military and War Powers
Although an exegesis of presidential powers is beyond the scope of
this Essay, a few key points are essential. The presidency is vested with
“the executive power.”74 Some commentators argue this grant includes

67. Congress generally adjusts the manpower and funds equipment acquisition, maintenance
and military operations in annual legislation. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283 (Dec. 12, 2017) (authorizing appropriations
for military activities, construction, and defense activities for 2018).
68. This alleged presidential power was highly leveraged in the legal rationalization for the
missile strikes on Syria. See Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 4–6 (discussing the
president’s powers as Commander in Chief).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
70. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
71. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
72. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing importance of national
legislative control over the military to preservation of individual rights).
73. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1801).
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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broad power to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs, qualified only by
express grants of foreign affairs powers to Congress, while others posit
that the Constitution confers no comprehensive foreign affairs powers
upon the presidency.75 The president is also denominated “Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States.”76 Whatever the scope of these presidential powers, nothing in the
structure or text of the Constitution suggests that they in any way
diminish Congress’s express or implied powers over the military, or its
singular constitutional authority over non-defensive use of military
force.77
Indeed, The Federalist strongly suggests that the Constitution
subordinates the presidency to Congress in almost all matters involving
the armed forces, except for commanding them in battle, including the
authority to initiate a non-defensive use of military force. For example,
several of Hamilton’s essays refer to the office of the presidency as only
a “chief magistrate,” with one stating that a president possesses authority
“in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor
of New York.”78

75. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 8–19 (2002) (surveying views of foreign affairs
scholars).
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
77. Note here that the Necessary and Proper Clause suggests exactly the opposite conclusion,
in that Congress is expressly granted the power not only “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers” but also, “[a]ll other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In his essays in The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
refers to the president and vice president as the “executive department.” See THE FEDERALIST NOS.
67, 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (indicating that all powers granted to the president are subject to
regulation by Congress). See also John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 46 (2014) (asserting that the latter section of the Necessary and Proper Clause
“gives Congress express authority over the implementation of the coordinate branches’ powers.
Hence, the notion that the president is the sole repository of the executive power does not resolve
to what degree, and by what means, Congress may regulate the exercise of such presidential
power.”). As Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, “[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress.” 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 77. The use of the term magistrate here is no accident.
Hamilton refers to the presidency as a “magistrate” or “chief magistrate” multiple times, including
in The Federalist No. 67, The Federalist No. 68, The Federalist No. 69, The Federalist No. 71, The
Federalist No. 72, The Federalist No. 73, The Federalist No. 74. and in several other places, in
each case distinguishing it from a monarch or hereditary chief magistrate. THE FEDERALIST NOS.
67–68, 71–74 (Alexander Hamilton). The term “magistrate” in relation to the presidency has
particular import for the use of military force that I will examine in more detail in future work.
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Regarding the commander in chief power, Hamilton clarified that a
president’s “authority would be nominally the same with that of the king
of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.”79 He described it
as “nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military
and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy.” 80
Hamilton further explained that the powers of “the British king extends
to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration [are granted]
to the legislature.”81 Hamilton thus clearly viewed the president’s power
as “commander in chief” to include only the authority to lead the military
in the pursuit of national objectives established by Congress rather than
independent authority to establish such objectives.82
It is true that Hamilton extolled the virtues of an energetic, independent
and unitary executive.83 To assuage concerns about creating an executive
with too much power, however, he clarified that the president would
remain “subordinate to the laws of the legislature” although not “fully
dependent upon the legislature.”84 He buttressed this with a rhetorical
question: “what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four
years duration with the confined authorities of a president of the United
States?”85 Thus, while Hamilton observed that “in the conduct of war
. . . the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security,”
he nowhere suggested that the president would have independent
constitutional authority to initiate a war or any other non-defensive use
of military force, or to violate any related domestic legislation limiting
that force. In fact, Hamilton several times expressly rejected any such
notion.
The Federalist also explains why both the executive branch and the
states are, and must be, subordinate to Congress when it comes to using
non-defensive military force. In The Federalist No. 3, John Jay clarified
that the national government must possess the foreign affairs and war
powers to prevent self-interested states from giving other nations just

79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 234 (emphasis added) (“The [president] would have a right to command the military
and naval forces of the nation; the [king of Great Britain], in addition to this right, possesses that
of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority.”). Hamilton
later refers to the president’s power as the “direction of war” rather than its initiation. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 77.
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton).
85. Id.
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cause for war when not in the national interest.86 Later, Jay also explained
why Congress, rather than the president, must possess sovereign powers
related to the use of military force. He observed:
[A]bsolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get
nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as
thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or
private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or
partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the
mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified
by justice or the voice and interests of his people.87

Jay then explained how the Constitution prevented this situation. He
acknowledged that “inducements to war” then existed and will often
arise, and that they can be manipulated to justify military action.88 It is
therefore essential, Jay argued, that one national government possess the
power to decide when to use military force:
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may
be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize,
assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the
benefit of its foresight and precautions to each.89

Most tellingly, Jay referred to the national government making these
decisions as a collective entity rather than an individual:
[N]ot only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act
advisedly . . . .90

Jay thereby clearly distinguished the careful conduct expected of a
pluralistic government from the unpredictable conduct expected of a
chief executive with untrammeled discretion to use military force. He
thereby strongly indicates that the “government” deciding these
important issues under the Constitution would include Congress, not
merely the president.
Jay further explained that a single national government would place
the militias under a unified command to be used for the benefit of the
whole union:

86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay).
87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 16–17 (John Jay) (vol. 1, J. and A. McLean 1788).
88. Id. at 18 (“[W]henever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation,
pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.”).
89. Id.
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 86, at 15 (vol. 1, J. and A. McLean 1788).
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It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any
particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State
governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of
concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of
discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination
to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps,
and thereby render them more efficient than if divided . . . .91

Jay continued, “[a]s to those just causes of war which proceed from
direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good
national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that
sort than can be derived from any other quarter.”92
At this point it is important to recall that the Constitution grants
Congress the power to establish the national system for organizing,
training, regulating and calling forth the state militias. 93 The president is
given only the power to command them “when called into actual service”
pursuant to the system enacted by Congress. 94 This arrangement
reinforces the view that the commander in chief power refers only to a
centralized commander that executes national policies established and
limited by Congress.95 It does not grant the president autonomous
constitutional authority to use or to direct the military in any way he or
she desires in either domestic governance or foreign affairs.
The Federalist also clarifies why the Constitution does not grant the
president entirely independent power to conduct the nation’s foreign
affairs generally. Some essays focus on the need for a unified
confederation to protect against foreign influence and interference with
domestic tranquility.96 In his essays on the executive department,
however, Hamilton attempted to allay concerns about the potential power
of the presidency by explaining that Congress may constrain or check the

91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, supra note 87, at 18–19.
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 86, at 14.
93. See supra Section I.A (describing Congressional powers over the military and their
enumeration in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution).
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 79, at 233–34 (“The
President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by
legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union.”).
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 82, at 269 (“Of all the cares or concerns of government,
the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of
power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the
power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the
definition of the executive authority.”).
96. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2–5 (John Jay) (discussing the necessity of acting as a
unified nation to preserve the peace and tranquility of the nation from the interference and influence
of foreign nations).
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exercise of almost all of the presidency’s powers, especially those related
to foreign affairs.97
Specifically related to foreign influence and executive power,
Hamilton noted the threat of “cabal, intrigue and corruption . . . chiefly
from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our
councils . . . by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of
the Union.”98 He then explained why it would be “utterly unsafe and
improper to” entrust the treaty making power solely to “an elective
magistrate of four years duration.”99
[A] man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief
magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender fortune, and looking
forward to a period not very remote when he may probably be obliged
to return to the station from which he was taken, might sometimes be
under temptations to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it would
require superlative virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be
tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth.
An ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of
a foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents. The
history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests
of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate
97. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the limited power of
the President to appoint temporary Senate seats in Legislative recess).
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). He argued
that the electoral college and other requirements created by the Constitutional Convention regarding
those eligible to hold the presidency were essential to prevent such foreign influence.
But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident
and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend
on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute
their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people
of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of
making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those
who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office.
Id. at 228. Relatedly, Hamilton thought a president’s eligibility for reelection would encourage him
or her to act in the national rather than personal interest, the latter of which might result from having
a predetermined, constitutionally-limited time in office.
An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when
he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not
easy to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed
while it lasted, and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to
make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory; though the same man, probably, with
a different prospect before him, might content himself with the regular perquisites of his
situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of his
opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 257–58 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788).
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 273–74 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788).
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created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United
States.100

If these concerns surround the treaty making power, they are
undoubtedly amplified when it comes to the delicate and potentially
momentous decisions to use non-defensive military force, just as Jay
suggested.101
In sum, The Federalist points decidedly toward the conclusion that
Congress, not the presidency, possesses sole constitutional power to
authorize all non-defensive uses of military force, and plays an important
role constraining the presidency’s command of the military and its
conduct of foreign affairs matters more generally. They also indicate that
Congress has substantial authority to regulate even defensive military
force, including the access to, and the organization and regulation of, the
military forces necessary to exercise it.
C. Judicial Precedent
The broadly-held original understanding that Congress possesses sole
constitutional power over non-defensive uses of military force explains
why pre-World War II Supreme Court precedent consistently held that
only express or implied congressional authorization, or an imperative
defensive or protective necessity, justifies an invasion or deprivation of
the rights of United States citizens or of foreign nationals by military
force. For example, naval commanders who captured foreign-flagged
vessels that were beyond the scope of congressionally-authorized
hostilities were held liable for trespass,102 even if their actions were
consistent with executive branch orders or guidance.103 During the
Mexican-American War, an Army commander who seized the private
property of a United States citizen without adequate proof of an
imperative necessity to do so was personally responsible for damages.104
Similarly, a Civil War commander who ordered the criminal prosecution
of a United States citizen by military tribunal when the civil courts were
open was required to pay nominal damages.105
100. Id. at 274.
101. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, supra note 87 (describing the need to use force in a uniform
manner to protect against foreign interference and influence).
102. Little v. Berreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177–79 (1804); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,
6 U.S. 64, 122–26 (1804).
103. See, e.g., Little, 6 U.S. at 178–79 (discussing how the law “shall be carried into effect”
against naval commanders even though the president had ordered naval captains to seize vessels
engaged in illicit commerce).
104. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 137 (1851).
105. Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871). However, the trial by military
tribunal was found unconstitutional in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 128–29 (1866).
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Many other Supreme Court decisions confirm the view that only
express or clearly implied congressional authorization, or an imperative
defensive necessity, is needed to justify an abrogation of life, liberty or
property rights by military force.106 Put differently, a president or
subordinate commander’s domestic legal authority to invade individual
rights by a use of military force is governed by congressional enactments
and well-established doctrines of necessity rather than the uncertainties
of domestic political posturing or the whims of the executive branch.107
III. HOW CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE LOST CONTROL
In light of the Constitution’s text and structure, as well as its welldocumented original understanding, it is both surprising and alarming
that the modern presidency has accrued so much practical (if not legal)
power in this area. A variety of factors have contributed to this situation.
Most significantly, Congress has relinquished several of its relevant
powers—often appropriately—without jealously guarding its remaining
powers, in particular, its plenary powers to limit funding for military
operations and to authorize the use of non-defensive military force. This
Part briefly surveys significant developments that appear to have
emboldened presidents to use non-defensive force unilaterally.
First, since World War II, geopolitical realities have changed rather
drastically. Due to the nature and global distribution of military power—
including intercontinental nuclear weapons—as well as the globalized
106. For a more complete collection and categorization of relevant precedent, including the
relevant doctrines of necessity expressly and implicitly recognized in it, see generally John C.
Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMPLE
L. REV. 599, 616–48 (2011) [hereinafter Dehn, Necessities]; see also John C. Dehn, Customary
International Law, the Separation of Powers, and the Choice of Law in Armed Conflict, 102
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2134–152 (2016) [hereinafter Dehn, Choice of Law].
107. Dehn, Necessities, supra note 106, at 616–48. Situations of extreme emergency may be
one area in which politics may supersede law. In theory, such situations allow a president to violate
the law so long as he informs Congress and they ratify his behavior. The problem is that, in practice,
presidents are often immune from civil suit for their official military actions, see, e.g., Durand v.
Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186) (dismissing claim for property damage in
Nicaraguan town caused by naval bombardment independently ordered by the president), and
Congress does not take formal action to check the president. This extreme emergency power may
in fact be more properly considered a political rather than a legal power, in that Congress may ratify
whatever it wishes and the compelling government interests at stake would likely result in judicial
deference, as occurred in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944). For a
discussion, see Dehn, Necessities, supra note 106, at 651–61. In my view, it is a mistake to translate
this theoretical, extreme emergency power to any use of military force that does not implicate the
most significant security interests of the United States. Proponents of the “political question” view
of war powers see things differently. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50
B.U. L. REV. 19, 23 (1970) (“[T]he existence of an emergency is largely a political not a judicial
question. If the president abuses his power, the only recourse is subsequent congressional action
and, ultimately, the displeasure of the electorate.”).
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economy and other factors, America now defines its strategic interests
quite broadly.108 At least annually, Congress funds and equips a large,
complex and well-trained military force to protect those interests.109 As
the Framers feared, however, presidents with readily available armed
forces are often tempted to use them in ways that do not clearly benefit
the nation’s long-term interests.110
Second, Congress has not only raised, equipped and maintained a large
and permanent national armed force, it has also provided said force with
significant funding to conduct global operations. This includes naval
vessels conducting maritime patrols far from United States shores.111 It
also includes substantial numbers of troops semi-permanently stationed
in other countries.112 As the commander in chief and chief diplomat with

108. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, The National Security Strategy for the United States of
America, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf [https://perma.cc/28KS-NNR5] (describing America’s
strategic vision as “protecting the American people and preserving our way of life, promoting our
prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence in the world”);
Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter Obama NSS],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/FCK9-H96R] (characterizing America’s strategic agenda as “ambitious”);
George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy for the United States of America, WHITE HOUSE
(Mar. 2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ [https://perma.cc/29XCYE3N] (stating America’s strategy as “to protect the security of the American people”); see also
RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R43838, A SHIFT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE—ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2
(2018) (discussing the shift towards “grand strategy” of the US defense budgets, plans, and
programs).
109. See NESE F. DEBRUYNE & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE,
R98756, DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS BILLS: FY1961–FY2019, at 1 (2018)
(“Congress oversees the defense budget primarily through two yearly bills: the defense
authorization and defense appropriations bills.”).
110. See James Madison, Letters of Helvidius No. 4 (Sept. 14 1793) available at
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0070 [https://perma.cc/F4P5-NK27]
(“It is in war . . . that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle.
The strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; . . . the honorable or
venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.”). Treanor, supra
note 11, at 700 (“The founding generation believed that, if the President could commit the nation
to war, his desire for fame might lead him into war even when war was not in the national interest.”);
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, supra note 87 and related text (describing how human nature may
cause single person to seek personal gain, glory, and ambition through war).
111. See, e.g., Obama NSS, supra note 108, at 13 (stressing importance of maritime security
from the Arctic, to the Caribbean, to Southeast Asia and Horn of Africa).
112. See, e.g., UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, FACT SHEET: U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
IN EUROPE (1945–2016) (May 26, 2016), https://www.eucom.mil/doc/35220/u-s-forces-in-europe
[https://perma.cc/77L3-NE9W] (showing roughly 62,000 United States active military personnel
authorized in Europe); MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R41481, U.S.SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS 10–11 (2017) (discussing length of U.S. troop presence in South
Korea).
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at least some discretion to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs,113 a
president enjoys substantial discretion—subject to funding constraints—
to employ the military in non-hostile ways that he or she deems
geopolitically useful.114 Regular congressional funding, which now
includes a large “slush fund” for “overseas contingency operations,”115
provides presidents with ample monetary means to threaten, provoke, or
initiate a use of military force without first consulting Congress. 116
Third, presidents and their legal advisors have arguably ignored or
misinterpreted the text of the War Powers Resolution (WPR). After
presidential excesses related to the conflict in Vietnam and its spillover
to Cambodia, Congress attempted to reaffirm its authority over the
nation’s use of military force by adopting the WPR over President
Nixon’s veto.117 It requires congressional notification and subsequent
approval of certain military deployments likely to result in the use of nondefensive military force.118
Executive branch legal advisors argue that the WPR authorizes a
president to use the military in any way he or she desires for some period
of time,119 or that the WPR is an unconstitutional intrusion upon
presidential powers.120 These arguments effectively nullify a codified
section of the WPR, which declares:
[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war,
(2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created

113. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 75, at 95–98 (describing where the Constitution grants the
power to determine foreign relations, which includes authority granted to the president).
114. Id. at 119–22.
115. See generally BRENDAN W. MCGARRY & EMILY M. MORGENSTERN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44519, OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING: BACKGROUND AND STATUS 9
(2019).
116. For an analysis of the constitutional power to threaten or provoke war, see Matthew C.
Waxman, The Constitutional Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 1626, 1635 (2014).
117. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (November 7, 1973) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549 (2019)).
118. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543–1544 (2019).
119. See Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing the War Powers Resolution
implicitly approves unilateral presidential uses of military force and, in a footnote, arguing that its
constraints do not limit the president).
120. See, e.g., Overview of the War Powers Resolution, 8 Op. O.L.C. 271, 274–75 (Theodore
B. Olson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Legal Counsel 1984) (“The Executive Branch has taken the
position from the very beginning that § 2(c) of the WPR does not constitute a legally binding
definition of Presidential authority to deploy our armed forces.”).
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by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces.121

In other words, Congress attempted to reestablish, and the executive
branch has effectively ignored, what the Framers of the Constitution
clearly understood: that a president may use military force only pursuant
to congressional authorization or an imperative necessity to defend the
nation, its possessions, or its instrumentalities.122
Fourth, despite the WPR, Congress has failed to formally and
consistently condemn presidents for unconstitutional uses of military
force.123 One cannot help but wonder if this apathy is in part the product
of its members’ excessive partisanship or political cowardice—a desire
to avoid accountability at the ballot box for formally taking a position
with respect to a specific military endeavor.
For example, when the Obama administration sought specific
congressional authorization to fight the Islamic State, a Republicancontrolled Congress demurred.124 When the Obama administration
sought congressional authorization to strike Syria for its alleged use of
chemical weapons, Congress failed to give it, and several Republican
members expressed skepticism of its utility.125 When the Trump
administration conducted missile strikes against Syria without seeking
congressional preapproval, some of those same Republican members of
Congress expressed approval or tentative approval.126 Perhaps these
inconsistent responses were influenced by the 2008 Democratic
presidential primaries—in which a central focus was a candidate’s vote

121. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c); Overview of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 120, at 274
(claiming that, although enacted, the Senate and House dispute over this section, now codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1541(c), was resolved by agreeing that it represents only policy, not law, and that it
therefore has no legal affect).
122. The defense of US citizens abroad is a more difficult constitutional question that I intend
to address in future work.
123. See infra Part IV (discussing the argument that authority is granted by Congressional
failure to condemn unconstitutional uses of military force).
124. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, A Congress That Doesn’t Want to Weigh In on War, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/a-congress-that-doesntwant-to-weigh-in-on-war.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/HJC9-LBS2] (quoting members
of Congress unwilling to approve a new authorization to use military force against the Islamic
State).
125. Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval for Strike in Syria, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html
[https://perma.cc/DP7B-6SFM].
126. Nicholas Fandos, Divided on Strikes, Democrats and Republican Press for Clearer Syria
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/us/politics/congresssyria-trump.html [https://perma.cc/AA6Y-6U6E].
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or firmly expressed opinion with respect to the questionable 2003 Iraq
invasion.127
Fifth, the courts largely avoid adjudicating cases that implicate the use
of military force, particularly its initiation. There are notable but limited
examples of judicial review with respect to the adoption of specific
measures within an existing conflict, including Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush.128 However, federal
courts most often dismiss cases that involve a president’s unilateral use
of military force,129 including those brought under the WPR.130 The
upshot of this liberal judicial application of political question, official
immunity, and other judicial avoidance doctrines is to leave essential
legal questions about the war powers unanswered or ambiguous.131 As
noted earlier, however, the federal courts traditionally adjudicated cases
involving the executive’s use of military force to abrogate individual
rights, including its authority to resort to the non-defensive use of war
powers.132
A final factor seems to be that “we the people” no longer demand
accountability for most decisions to use military force. One might be
127. See, e.g., Robert P. Saldin, Foreign Affairs and the 2008 Election, 6 FORUM 1, 8–9 (2008)
(discussing benefits of Obama’s “unique position” opposing the Iraq war).
128. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
129. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 774 (2003), aff’d,
378 F.3d 1346, 1361–70 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005) (dismissing the claim
and stating that “the Court may not look behind the President’s discharge of his Constitutional
duties as Commander in Chief”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 267,
276 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 559 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 330 F. App’x 200
(D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing the claim as involving
sovereign immunity and presents a nonjusticiable political question).
130. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902–03 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dismissing a claim that the president’s decision to supply military aid
violated the WPR as a nonjusticiable political question); Sanchez Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp.
596, 602 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F. 2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing allegations that the
president’s foreign assistance in Nicaragua violated the WPR as the allegations presented a
nonjusticiable political question).
131. See, e.g., Steven I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1295,
1329 (2012) (suggesting that at the Circuit level, more is going on than “faithful application of
existing precedent,” leaving room for ambiguity in resolution).
132. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 647 (1862) (describing the two scenarios: power
to repel insurrections and invasions, which was given to the president by Congress, and the power
to declare war, which is limited to Congress alone). Note that there were two grounds for the
majority decision upholding Lincoln’s resort to non-defensive war measures after the attack on Fort
Sumter. The first was that statutes authorized the president to determine how to respond to a
rebellion and therefore implicitly authorized him to determine that a war existed. Id. at 668. The
other was that Congress had ratified his actions. Id. at 670–71. The dissent would have required
Congress to formally recognize the existence of a civil war before non-defensive force was
permitted. Id. at 690–95.
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tempted to claim that this indifference stems from a democracy deficit
that resulted from ending the draft. Because less than one percent of the
American public now serves in the military,133 a majority of Americans
may no longer be attuned to or sufficiently interested in military forays
abroad. This problem may also stem from or be exacerbated by a
significant lack of constitutional and civic literacy. 134 Whatever the
reason(s), the apparent lack of general public interest or concern about
the Constitution’s allocation of war powers likely relates to the nature of
the threats present in the world today and the perceived need for a large,
powerful, responsive and agile military to confront them.135
The upshot of these and other factors is an executive branch
emboldened to initiate non-defensive military force without consulting
Congress, without sufficient consideration for long-term American
interests, and without clear domestic legal authority to abrogate the rights
of other nations, of foreign nationals, or of United States citizens. If we
learn anything from President’s Trump border emergency declaration,136
or from his more recent decision to target and kill an Iranian general that
might have escalated to a wider war,137 it should be that making it too
easy for a president to unilaterally declare or create an emergency, and
too difficult for Congress to control or reverse those decisions, upsets the
constitutional equilibrium, ignores the will of the people, and undermines
the rule of law.138 This situation is unlikely to change unless the people
133. GEORGE M. REYNOLDS & AMANDA SHENDRUK, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE U.S. MILITARY 1–2 (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/article/
demographics-us-military [https://perma.cc/M2DG-X6VA] (placing number at approximately 0.5
percent of the US population).
134. See Sheila Kennedy, Civic Ignorance and Democratic Accountability, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
419 (2019).
135. As Alexander Hamilton observed,
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the
ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction
of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of
continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose
and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political
rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 41, at 41 (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). Although Hamilton
was here speaking of the risk of standing armies that would be created by a failure of the colonies
to unite in a new constitutional confederacy, his observation has proven salient in both the national
and international context at least since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
136. Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States,
Fed. Reg. 34, 4949, 4949–50 (Feb. 20, 2019).
137. See generally President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of
Qasem Soleimani (Jan. 3, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-killing-qasem-soleimani/ [https://perma.cc/2P83-YUK7]).
138. When granting a partial preliminary injunction against the Trump Administration’s attempt
to use emergency authorities to divert federal funds to construction of a border barrier otherwise
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and their elected representatives demand respect for the original
constitutional design and understanding.
IV. WHY ABERRANT PRACTICE CANNOT ESTABLISH NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In light of these developments, some commentators appear to have
assimilated their contemporary views of the Constitution to current
realities. One commentator, echoing the claims of many constitutional
scholars, has proposed that constitutional concerns surrounding the use
of military force should focus on whether Congress and the presidency
engage in proper “war politics” and doubts the relevance of “juristic
norms.”139 Another suggests that the Constitution has effectively been
amended by practice to permit presidents to use at least some nondefensive force unilaterally.140 Some add to these views the idea that we
must construe independent presidential power to use non-defensive force
more broadly in light of modern geopolitical complexities.141 Still
another commentator suggests that Congress’s power to declare war is a
very narrow and limited power to formally declare war, and that

lacking congressional authorization in Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883, 927 (N.D. Cal.
2019), motion to stay denied, 2019 WL 2305341, at *2 (N.D. Cal 2019), the court observed
Congress’s “absolute” control over federal expenditures—even when that control may
frustrate the desires of the Executive Branch regarding initiatives it views as important—
is not a bug in our constitutional system. It is a feature of that system, and an essential
one. The Appropriations Clause is “a bulwark of the Constitution’s separation of powers
among the three branches of the National Government, and is particularly important as
a restraint on Executive Branch officers.”
Id. at 54 (citations omitted). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential claim[s] to a[n emergency] power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system.”).
139. ZEISBERG, supra note 13, at 21–24. See also POWELL, supra note 75, at 126 (“[T]here is
no way to disentangle the constitutional from the policy and the political in questions about the
formulation and implementation of United States foreign affairs.”); Monaghan, supra note 107, at
32 (“To my mind, therefore, any attempt to circumscribe on constitutional grounds the president’s
power to use armed force abroad confuses political with constitutional issues.”).
140. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 24, at 48 (discussing how practice can be decisive from a
legal point of view).
141. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 107, at 27 (“Whatever the intention of the framers, the
military machine has become simply an instrument for the achievement of foreign policy goals,
which, in turn, have become a central responsibility of the presidency. . . . [T]he only limitation
upon presidential power has been that imposed by political considerations. That is the teaching of
our history.”); id. at 28 (“A line between aggressive and defensive action might have been workable
in the era of Jefferson and Madison . . . . But that distinction can have little meaning for the
president of a great global power in a highly complex and interdependent world.”).

2019]

War is More Than a Political Question

511

Congress’s sole means to limit a president’s misuse of the armed forces
is to deny funding for military measures to which it objects.142
All of these approaches significantly discount the importance of —or
grossly misinterpret—the Constitution’s original design and meaning.
The first embraces alleged ambiguity that has largely been manufactured
by aberrant executive branch practice over time. The last appears to be a
misreading of history and precedent.143 The others expressly claim or
implicitly suggest that the elected branches of government may alter the
original constitutional design and meaning by later practice. This Essay’s
earlier analysis addressed the arguments underpinning the claims based
in the Constitution’s text. This Part will therefore address whether
subsequent practice can alter a well-established, original constitutional
meaning regarding the Constitution’s functional allocation of the power
to use military force.
Historical practice is often considered when addressing ambiguities in
the text or original meaning of the Constitution, particularly in situations
involving the separation of powers.144 Sometimes referred to as
142. Yoo, supra note 28, at 193–94. Other commentators more or less agree with this view. See
Treanor, supra note 11, at 696–97 (listing pro-Executive commentators).
143. Professor Yoo’s misreading of history and precedent has been refuted in significant
measure by other commentators. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 24, at 41–45 (stating that Yoo’s
project is contrary to advice regarding war powers, ignores the change in American thinking
through pre- to post-Revolutionary period, and Yoo does not cite direct evidence to support his
position); RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 448 n.42–43 (stating that Yoo’s argument as it pertains to the
clause preventing the president’s unilateral initiation of war is unfounded in text or historical
practice); Prakash, supra note 11, at 58 (outlining that Yoo’s assertion is incorrect because if the
Constitution wanted to give the president war-making powers, it would have). A full account of the
inaccuracies in Yoo’s scholarship would require extensive commentary. To provide one example,
Professor Yoo’s analysis of some of the Supreme Court precedent discussed earlier, Bas. v. Tingy,
4 U.S. 37 (1800), Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801), Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), and
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), supra Section II.A, and related text, is
superficial and misleading. Professor Yoo first deceptively claims that “none of these cases called
upon the Supreme Court to decide that the president was waging war in violation of the
Constitution, or that Congress had failed to declare that a state of war existed, or that courts could
step in to adjudicate inter-branch disputes over war.” Yoo, supra note 28, at 293. Although these
statements are true as far as they go, they elide the fact that each of these cases did require the Court
to determine the ability of executive branch officers to claim authority to use certain war powers
against certain targets, as well as the relative authority of Congress and the president to authorize
and limit the use of those powers. After a cursory and seemingly result-oriented analysis, Yoo
concludes that “[n]either Bas, Talbot, nor Little (nor all three added together) constituted the
Marbury [v. Madison] of foreign relations law.” Id. at 294. While not the Marbury of “foreign
relations law,” the cases do engage in Marbury-style judicial review of war measures and therefore
strongly support the idea that the courts have a role in policing rights invasions when they have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. For a collection and analysis of similar precedent,
see Dehn, Choice of Law, supra note 106, at 2134–40 (referencing the Charming Betsy case, the
Little case, and The Prize Cases, among many others).
144. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (justifying resort to “the practice of the
government” particularly in separation of powers cases). For analysis of this approach in the context
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“historical gloss,” the basic notion is that gaps or ambiguities in the
Constitution’s text or meaning can be clarified by the practice of the
government.145 The idea that the elected branches of government can
alter the Constitution’s separation of powers by later practice rather than
formal amendment or constitutionally compliant legislation, however, is
suspect. This is particularly the case, it would seem, when doing so
substantially alters the functional constitutional basis for invading
fundamental individual rights.
The first problem with the notion that the Constitution’s separation of
powers can be altered rather than merely clarified by historical practice
is that it is, at bottom, a claim that the elected branches of government
can do informally what the text of the Constitution indicates they cannot
do formally without the consent of the people through their state
representatives.146 In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall stated
the truism that no branch of government may act in violation of the
Constitution, whether by formal legislation or other official act.147 As
Marshall noted, the Constitution declares that only laws made “in
pursuance” of its terms are supreme law of the land.148 Furthermore, the
idea that all government officials must act consistently with the
Constitution arises naturally from the fact of a written constitution and its
requirement that each member of government swear an oath of loyalty to
it.149 To paraphrase Marshall’s rhetorical question, why should all
members of the federal and state governments swear an oath to the
Constitution of the United States if it forms no rule for their official
acts?150
of the separation of powers, see Curtis A. Bradley & Niel S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 261–62 (2017) (stating
that while the historical gloss approach is frequently used, the approach is not fully defined); Curtis
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 411, 414–15 (2012) (emphasizing four overarching points in the analysis of historical gloss
and the separation of powers).
145. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 144, at 257; Bradley & Morrison, supra note 144, at 413–
14.
146. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring concurrence of three fourths of state legislatures or state
conventions to amend the Constitution).
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[T]he particular phraseology of the
Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential
to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well
as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”).
148. Id. at 180. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (stating the Constitution, laws of the United States,
and treaties, shall be the supreme “Law of the Land”).
149. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–80.
150. Id. at 180. Marshall refers to the judiciary and Congress in this section of the opinion, but
his logic is equally applicable to any member of either federal and state governments, all of whom
are constitutionally required to take a similar oath. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing
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Marshall addressed the idea that subsequent practice may clarify
constitutional meaning in McCulloch v. Maryland:
[A] doubtful [constitutional] question, one on which human reason may
pause, and the human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which
the great principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective
powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are
to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought
to receive a considerable impression from that practice. An exposition
of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts . . . ought
not to be lightly disregarded.151

Marshall thus provided three requirements necessary to giving
interpretive weight to government practice. First, the Constitution’s
meaning must be ambiguous. Second, the ambiguity and any related
subsequent government practice cannot pertain to “great principles of
liberty.” And third, the relevant practice of the elected branches must be
“deliberately established,” which in McCulloch involved statutes to
which both the executive and legislative branches assented.152
Similarly, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice
Frankfurter posited that “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of
conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation,
but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”153 He
therefore posited:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as
it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government,
may be treated as a gloss on executive [p]ower vested in the
President . . . .154

the president’s oath); id. art. VI, § 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this
Constitution.”).
151. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819).
152. Id.
153. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring) (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 610–11. This is not a claim that original meaning must always control constitutional
interpretation. It is a narrower claim that the functional allocation powers in the respective branches
of government cannot be altered without a valid congressional delegation or formal amendment.
Some might be tempted to assert that the Court’s abandonment of a strict non-delegation doctrine
with respect to legislative powers proves the opposite. However, some scholarly commentary
persuasively argues that the non-delegation doctrine was more myth than fact. See Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermule, Interring the Non-Delegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722–23
(2002) (“[T]here just is no constitutional nondelegation rule, nor has there ever been. The
nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard
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Frankfurter’s requirement for a consistent, unchallenged and unbroken
practice is similar to Marshall’s view that a practice must be “deliberately
established,” requiring actual or readily apparent assent to a government
practice by both elected branches of government. A majority of the
Supreme Court effectively embraced this approach in Dames & Moore v.
Regan.155
Applying these tenets to the constitutional power to use military force
undermines any argument that historical gloss has amended the
Constitution. Both Marshall and Frankfurter advanced the entirely logical
proposition that practice cannot violate or supplant the Constitution, and
neither limits this claim to its text. In other words, neither the text nor a
broadly held, firmly established original constitutional meaning or
understanding regarding the separation of powers may be altered by
subsequent practice on later claims of ambiguity or by aberrant
government practice.156 A proper reading of the Constitution’s text and
adoption history, as well as a review of early practice and judicial
precedent clearly establishes that there is no substantial ambiguity
regarding the Constitution’s original allocation of the power to initiate
non-defensive military force to Congress alone.157 True ambiguity
surrounds only the scope of a president’s authority to use defensive force
when another nation has begun or declared war against the United
originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory. Nondelegation is nothing more than
a controversial theory that floated around the margins of nineteenth-century constitutionalism—a
theory that wasn’t clearly adopted by the Supreme Court until 1892, and even then only in dictum.
The Court’s invocation of the rule to invalidate two statutes in 1935 was nothing more than a local
aberration, no more to be taken as constitutionally fundamental than, say, the original package
doctrine, the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions, or any of a myriad other constitutional
eccentricities that few now bother remembering.”).
155. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). See also United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915) (giving interpretive weight to historical practice).
156. Recent commentary suggests that giving a prominent if not primary role to originalist
constructions of the Constitution’s text is preferable. See Curtis A. Bradley & Nigel S. Siegel,
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1230 (2015) (stating that
the text in constitutional practice is not able to be changed by common law methods but has to be
changed through a formal amendment). Bradley and Siegal posit that “the authoritative meaning of
the constitutional text [is] determined by a process of constructed constraint” and that “the theory
of constructed constraint suggests . . . that originalists have conceded too little ground, not too
much.” Id. at 1270.
157. Prakash, supra note 11, at 93–94 (“If one looks to the Framers, it is clear that they regarded
the power to “declare war” as encompassing the power to start a war. The same is true of the
Ratifiers—they too believed the Constitution granted Congress the power to start a war. If we look
for the original public meaning, public usage in Europe and America confirms that to enter into a
war was to declare it. Finally, if we look to those who implemented the Constitution in its early
years, we see a consensus that only Congress could take the nation from peace into war. While a
constitution surely could incorporate the narrow, formal definition of “declare war,” there is no
evidence that the federal Constitution did or that anyone regarded it as so doing.”).
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States.158 Assertions that contemporary ambiguity resulting from
unilateral presidential practice and instances of congressional
acquiescence reduces the issue to merely a political question or amends
the Constitution are highly problematic.159
Marshall also asserted that any constitution-clarifying government
practice may not pertain to a matter involving “the great principles of
liberty.” Presumably, Marshall here speaks of the fundamental principles
protecting life, liberty, and property as highlighted in the Declaration of
Independence, among other places.160 The gist of Marshall’s concern
appears to be that the practice of the elected branches should not be
determinative when it amounts to altering the government’s power to
affect fundamental individual rights.
Marshall’s concern logically applies to any government practice that
substantially alters the functional constitutional basis or authority for
abrogating such individual rights. Preserving the Constitution’s
separation of powers is an important aspect of protecting these basic
liberty interests. As Justice Scalia explained in his NLRB v. Noel Canning
concurrence, the Constitution’s “core, government-structuring provisions
are no less critical to preserving liberty than are the later adopted
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”161 He noted, these “structural provisions
reflect the founding generation’s deep conviction that ‘checks and
balances provisions were the foundation of a structure of government that
would protect liberty.’”162 He continued “[i]t is for that reason that ‘the
claims of individuals—not of Government departments—have been the
principal source of judicial decisions concerning separation of powers
and checks and balances.’”163

158. Compare id. at 94–112 (concluding the president is limited to strictly defensive measures
even if another nation has declared war on the United States) with Michael D. Ramsey, The
President’s Power to Respond to Attacks, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 169, 177 (2007) (arguing “historical
evidence supports president’s ability to use offensive military measures if another country initiates
war”). See also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority.”).
159. But see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (“These precedents show that
this Court has treated practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity
of that practice is subject to dispute . . . .”).
160. For an excellent analysis of the modern importance of the Declaration of Independence in
constitutional interpretation, see Alexander Tsesis, The Declaration of Independence and
Constitutional Interpretation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 369 (2016).
161. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 570 (Scalia, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 571 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986)).
163. Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011)).
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Although many commentators sympathetic to the “political question”
view of war powers consider it to be primarily or exclusively a foreign
affairs power,164 there is no question that this power also implicates
fundamental liberty interests. As noted earlier, the cases in which the
courts have engaged in judicial review of war measures conclusively
establish that this power entails legal authority to invade rights to life,
liberty, or property, including those of Americans.165 This entails, among
other things, the ability to deprive American citizens of these rights by
confiscating their property,166 or forcing them to serve in the active armed
forces—for example via a draft or a reserve component activation167—to
support a given military conflict. It also includes the power to impose
domestic emergency measures incident to any resulting conflict,168 as
well as the power to generate fiscal requirements to support a protracted
military engagement that Congress and, ultimately the people, will be
required to fund.
Even more significantly, the power to initiate non-defensive military
force includes the power to capture and detain or to kill foreign nationals
and even American citizens who are properly determined to be part of an
“enemy” armed force.169 The Supreme Court has also upheld the capture
164. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 75, at 130–31 (stating that controversies regarding exercises
of foreign policy are usually political questions which are not within the purview of the judiciary
to resolve); ZEISBERG, supra note 13, at 21 (stating hostilities within the Constitution are a political
question regarding the security power); Monaghan, supra note 107, at 23 (stating reliance on the
political question doctrine is appropriate in foreign affairs).
165. See supra Section II.C (detailing the judicial precedent Congress possesses over nondefensive uses of military force).
166. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 174–75 (1804) (implicitly finding ships and vessels
may be seized when they carry goods that may defeat the U.S.’s measures); The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. 635, 655 (1862) (stating a citizen’s property may be liable to capture and confiscation);
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 133 (1851) (stating as a general rule, it is not legal to trade with
a public enemy and if caught, the goods are liable to seizure and confiscation).
167. Regarding the draft, see Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-599,
64 Stat. 318 (codified June 30, 1950) (empowering the president to order the Reserves into the
active military with or without their consent for no more than a twenty-one consecutive month
period). Regarding reserve component activation, see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 16 (stating that
Congress has the power to reserve the “[a]ppointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress[.]”).
168. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing for suspension of writ of habeas corpus).
169. For concise analysis of constitutional issues arising in a case involving the targeting of
“enemy” American citizens, including a review of relevant Supreme Court precedent, see generally
John C. Dehn & Kevon Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar Al-Alaqui, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 175 (2011); John C. Dehn, Targeting Citizens in Armed Conflict: Examining the
Threat to the Rule of Law . . . in Context, CATO UNBOUND: J. DEBATE (June 8, 2011),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/06/08/john-c-dehn/targeting-citizens-armed-conflictexamining-threat-rule-law-context [https://perma.cc/9QMP-QPCR] (arguing judicial precedent
clearly holds or implies that the president has constitutional authority to kill or capture and detain
U.S. citizens properly deemed enemies at war with the United States).
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or destruction of the property of American citizens when properly
deemed enemy property.170 Allowing a president unilateral authority to
use non-defensive military force removes Congress from a constitutional
decision-making process that is meant to limit courses of action that
threaten to and often do deprive individuals, including American citizens,
of basic rights in these ways.
Modern limitations on judicial remedies for injuries arising from
military operations do not alter the conclusion that the decision to use
military force implicates great principles of liberty. Both Congress and
the courts have made it more difficult to obtain judicial remedies for
individual rights invasions by government officials,171 particularly in
relation to military operations and other matters arising outside the United
States.172 These contemporary restrictions on judicial remedies may alter
the perception of whether great liberty principles are implicated by the
use of non-defensive military force. They do not, however, change the
fact the power to use military force includes the power to deprive
American citizens and foreign nationals of their fundamental rights. Why
would the Framers have devoted so much attention to congressional
control of the military establishment and the use of military force if not
to protect the people from abuses of those institutions and powers?173
The last factor relevant to whether historical practice provides
competent evidence of constitutional meaning is that there must be
relatively clear and, when necessary, consistent agreement about a given
practice between the executive and legislative branches. Under
170. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671–75 (upholding capture and condemnation of property of
citizens of states in rebellion against authority of the United States); Miller v. U.S., 78 U.S. 268,
304–08 (1870) (similar); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 307–11 (1909) (refusing
compensation for destruction of American citizen deemed enemy property in enemy territory).
171. See generally Vladeck, supra note 131; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United
States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 764 (2003), aff’d, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
1139 (2005) (resolving that “[t]he Constitutional protection afforded by the Takings Clause is not
intended to compensate for destruction of enemy war-making property through the exercise of
military force.”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 267, 276 (D.D.C.
2005), aff’d, 559 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 330 F. App’x 200 (D.C. Cir.
2009), aff’d, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating the political question doctrine
prevents courts from reviewing claims of political branches’ decisions regarding foreign policy or
national security).
172. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. §1346(b), §1402(b),
§2401(b), and §§ 2671–2680, converts claims against federal employees acting within the scope of
their office or employment into claims against the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). Jurisdiction
is then barred for claims “arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or
the Coast Guard, during time of war,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), and claims “arising in a foreign
country,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
173. For a discussion of the dangers attending standing armies and the continual danger of war,
see THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 41.
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Marshall’s reasoning in McCulloch, this can take the form of enacted
legislation, although legislation is not always dispositive if found to
violate clear constitutional requirements or constraints. 174 According to
Frankfurter, it can also arise from a long, unbroken executive practice
known to and accepted by Congress. Neither is present in this area of
constitutional law.
The WPR alone is strong evidence that Congress does not accept or
agree with modern presidential assertions of unilateral power to use nondefensive military force.175 Commentators have documented other,
more-recent situations in which Congress did not entirely acquiesce in
assertions of presidential power in this area,176 despite noting institutional
factors that limit Congress’s ability to do so.177 Although a thorough
review of recent congressional reactions is beyond the scope of this
Essay, the evidence is clear enough that not all claims of a unilateral
presidential power to use non-defensive military force have gone
unchallenged by Congress. To claim that modern presidential practice
coupled with, at best, inconsistent congressional responses somehow
alters or clarifies the Constitution is to give a dangerous and—in light of
the Constitution’s original allocation of war- and military-related powers
to Congress—entirely unwarranted institutional preference to the
historical practice of the presidency.178
V. REESTABLISHING ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS OVER NONDEFENSIVE MILITARY FORCE
Because the Constitution allocates superior authority over the military
establishment and its use to Congress, and because historical practice
cannot alter this original meaning, it is imperative that Congress
aggressively reassert its powers. Specifically, this requires that Congress
more closely control funding for military operations as well as more
consistently and formally condemn unconstitutional uses of force. This
174. The clearest example here is I.N.S. v. Chadha, in which the Court held unconstitutional a
one-house, legislative “veto” of executive branch discretionary decisions made pursuant to a
statute. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The Court noted that the congressional veto was legislative in
nature in part because it was “action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties and relations of persons.” Id. at 952.
175. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 144, at 467 (“[A]ny claim of congressional
acquiescence in this area needs to take account of the War Powers Resolution—and not just the
sections that some commentators construe as accepting a certain measure of unilateral presidential
authority.”).
176. Id. at 461–68.
177. Id. at 440–44.
178. See also id. at 468 (“[C]ongress’s influence on presidential war powers should not be
judged simply by the rare times when it enacts legislation restricting presidential action.”).
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Part briefly explains why this congressional response is necessary and
suggests how Congress might respond to constitutionally aberrant
presidential uses of force in the future.
First, it is important to recall that the oath taken by every member of
Congress requires them to support the Constitution.179 As Marshall
stated, this means that these elected officials are legally and morally
obligated to abide by the Constitution, and therefore to maintain the
Constitution’s separation of powers. Given its effect on fundamental
rights, this is especially true of the power to initiate the use of nondefensive military force.
As earlier discussed, however, Congress has exercised some of its
powers in ways that effectively cede much of its ability to check
executive power by limiting the size and nature of the military
establishment. If Congress accepts that the contemporary geopolitical
environment requires a large, complex, heavily-equipped, and highlytrained military with significant discretionary funding to defend and
advance American interests, then its powers to control the existence, size,
and composition of the armed forces is no longer a significant tool with
which to check presidential abuses of power. For similar reasons,
exercising its constitutional power to place restrictions on access to the
modern militia in response to external threats is also likely to be viewed
as unwise policy. Given the centrality of these congressional powers to
the Framers’ approach to preventing presidential abuses of the war
powers and tyranny, their effective nullification in response to the current
strategic environment is a significant loss.180
In light of these realities, Congress must more tightly control the
availability and expenditure of funds for military operations. One
approach is for Congress to prohibit the expenditure or commitment of
funds for the purpose of supporting or conducting any military
deployments, attacks or other activities that are inconsistent with the
WPR, particularly the section clarifying the limits of the president’s
constitutional authority to use military force.181 If Congress wants to
179. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
180. Interestingly, in response to an apparent concern that the two-year limitation on funding
was inadequate insurance against tyranny that might imposed by a large standing army, Hamilton
wrote,
[I]f the defense of the community . . . should make it necessary to have an army so
numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamaties [sic] for which there is
neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of
government . . . .
THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 72, at 167–68 (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788).
181. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (stating the president may use military force in a declaration of
war, with specific statutory authorization, or in a national emergency created by attack on the U.S.,
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grant the executive branch broader discretion to use force for a given
geopolitical situation, it can specifically provide for that discretion, either
by authorizing the stationing of troops there, which may defend
themselves if attacked, or in some other aspect of its annual authorizing
and funding legislation. This would give Congress a greater role in
identifying the nation’s key strategic interests that merit a rapid military
response.
There are certainly drawbacks to this proposal. One is that the
executive branch has claimed constitutional authority to violate similar
fiscal limitations in the past.182 Another is that giving Congress a role in
defining geopolitical interests that justify a rapid military response
reduces strategic agility. Unforeseen events can rapidly alter the
geopolitical environment. Regular coordination and review of strategic
priorities between the executive and legislative branches would likely be
time-consuming and difficult, but are essential to this proposal. Finally,
there is a risk that partisan politics coupled with the volume of
information needed to determine and establish these priorities might
render Congress either a rubber stamp for executive branch preferences
or an insurmountable obstacle to updating strategic priorities. Congress
would need to prioritize its institutional responsibilities to the nation over
its partisan attitudes toward a sitting president.183
Congress must also more aggressively defend its sole constitutional
authority to authorize non-defensive military force. The executive branch
typically cites instances of congressional intransigence or acquiescence
to unilateral presidential uses of non-defensive force to support its claims
of presidential power to engage in them.184 Congress must more
consistently and forcefully counter these claims through formal action
the U.S. territories, its possessions, or its armed forces).
182. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-326013, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 5 (2014) (in response to GAO
inquiry, the Department of Defense asserted that a funding limitation on the transfer of Taliban
prisoners unconstitutionally intruded on the president’s powers). For an analysis of this report and
related matters, see Celidon Pitt, Fair Trade: The President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S.
Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837,
2840–41 (2015) (arguing the exchange was illegal) and id. at 2876–85 (stating the president
violated spending restriction and appropriations riders).
183. For discussion and analysis of one way in which partisan politics influences the political
process related to wars, see generally Michael T. Heaney, The Partisan Politics of Antiwar
Legislation in Congress, 2001–2010, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 129.
184. See, e.g., Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 5–7 (explaining that historically,
the president has acted without Congress’ explicit authorization prior to taking military action);
Military Force in Libya Memorandum, supra note 6, at 7–9 (stating that historical practice generally
permits the president to initiate military force despite the absence of congressional approval and
Congress has implicitly recognized the presidential authority to do so).
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that identifies and condemns presidential overreach and reasserts its
institutional prerogatives.185
It also bears noting that neither the Constitution nor any laws made
pursuant to it—including any laws prohibiting the use of federal funds
for unauthorized military forays—are self-enforcing. Congress must
exercise its other constitutional authorities whenever a president ignores
such laws. These authorities primarily include the power to pass joint
resolutions that articulate a “sense of Congress” disagreeing with
presidential action,186 the power to censure a president,187 or, if
ultimately necessary, the power to impeach a president.188
CONCLUSION
The constitutional authority to use our nation’s substantial military
force to damage or destroy lives and property is not and should never be
reduced to merely a political question. The use of military force always
raises questions of law regarding the government’s authority to deprive
individuals, including Americans, of their most fundamental individual
rights. The text and structure of the Constitution, as well as The Federalist
essays, show that the Framers saw these risks and principles clearly and
designed our founding document accordingly. While a legal requirement
for congressional preapproval of non-defensive force may be perceived
as an inefficient mechanism for addressing the complex geopolitical
environment that now exists, it is the binding legal framework established
by our fundamental law. So long as it remains unamended, their oaths
obligate both Congress and the presidency to reestablish and to respect
these original constitutional norms when addressing the nation’s
contemporary security needs.

185. See, e.g., Joint Resolution Regarding United States Policy Toward Haiti, Pub. L. No. 103423, 108 Stat. 4358 (1994) (outlining the requirements the president and executive branch must
follow when using non-defensive force).
186. See, e.g., id. (expressing “sense of Congress” that “the President should have sought and
welcomed Congressional approval before deploying United States Armed Forces to Haiti.”).
187. On the constitutionality of a congressional censure, see Jack Chaney, The Constitutionality
of Censuring the President, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 989 (2000) (arguing censure is unconstitutional
Bill of Attainder); James C. Ho, Misunderstood Precedent: Andrew Jackson and the Real Case
Against Censure, 24 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL. 283, 303–07 (2000) (similarly asserting that
censure power is not founded in the historical record).
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole power
of impeachment); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6–7 (providing Senate power to try impeachment, prescribing
procedure, and limiting penalties). Others have suggested “charter” legislation for the domestic
national security system. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why a President Almost Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 95 YALE L.J. 1255, 1338–342 (1988) (asserting that
charter legislation would restore balance to national security matters).

